14 Nov
14Nov

An Open Letter to Professor Stuart Croft, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Warwick
Dear Vice-Chancellor,
You may be wondering why some Warwick alumni no longer give you money. Well, here is the reason—at least for one of them. I stopped donating to my alma mater because I believe in freedom of speech, and I have lost confidence that the University of Warwick does too.
Recently, I was explaining why I've stopped giving to a fellow alumna, who, like me, greatly enjoyed her time at Warwick. To her, it sounded like an overreaction. Like other British universities, Warwick publishes impressive codes of practice promising to defend academic freedom and open debate. Yet if you set aside what universities write in their rulebooks and look instead at what they actually do when someone expresses an unpopular opinion, a rather different picture can emerge.
Nowhere is that gap more apparent than in Warwick's handling of allegations against staff during the 2020–21 academic year. The subsequent findings of the University's own independent Assembly Working Party on Antisemitism and Racism make particularly uncomfortable reading.
Following the University's adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism, complaints were made about staff members' online activity relating to antisemitism and political expression. The Working Party's report, presented to the University Assembly in February 2024, records that Warwick investigated 15 members of staff in the 2020–21 academic year over online activity. In every single case, the conclusion was that no further action was necessary.
But the more disturbing finding concerns the way some of these investigations were conducted. The Working Party found that, in the cases it examined, the University moved immediately to Stage 3 of its disciplinary procedure—the most formal stage—rather than attempting a less formal preliminary investigation. It did so even where the alleged speech, if proved, could not reasonably be considered serious misconduct.
The report also recorded the considerable harm caused to those investigated, despite their eventual exoneration. It questioned the effectiveness of using disciplinary procedures to address allegations of antisemitism and warned that they must be constrained by the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and academic freedom.
This is not simply a question of whether a university eventually finds an employee guilty or innocent. It is a question of why academics should have to endure the anxiety, expense and professional uncertainty of a formal disciplinary investigation in circumstances where the alleged speech, even if proved, could not reasonably justify such proceedings.
In my view, this amounts to punishment by process. A university does not have to dismiss an academic, or even issue a formal warning, to create a chilling effect. The prospect of being subjected to months of investigation, legal expense and career uncertainty is quite sufficient to make people think twice before expressing an unpopular opinion. The message to the rest of the academic community is unmistakable: you may technically have the right to speak your mind, but exercising it can come at a considerable personal cost.
Given that these incidents often revolved around issues related to antisemitism, let me be clear about my own position, just so there is no misunderstanding. I am deeply unhappy with the policies of the current Israeli government, and I found the experience of visiting Israel very disagreeable. And the statistics regarding the deaths of children in the Gaza military operation should concern us all. 

But the whole point of freedom of speech is the toleration of opinions with which we disagree. It is particularly important to protect opinions that are unpopular, inconvenient or offensive to those who happen to hold positions of institutional authority.
My own position has always been that the presumption should always be in favour of freedom of expression. The fact that an opinion is offensive, unpopular, politically inconvenient or deeply upsetting should never, by itself, justify institutional intervention. Restrictions should be confined to clearly established legal grounds and should be necessary and proportionate. Universities should not invent additional restrictions simply because an opinion conflicts with their prevailing institutional values.
This is entirely consistent with something I learned from my time studying Politics at Warwick, the spirit of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty: the principle that the exercise of power over an individual is justified to prevent harm to others, not merely because their opinions are considered objectionable or offensive.
To be fair to you and the University, there have been subsequent developments. Following the work of the Assembly Working Party, Warwick approved a revised Regulation 29 and a Policy on Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom in January 2024. Regulation 29 was subsequently amended in July 2025. The University's current Freedom of Speech and Harassment Guidance also makes some welcome statements. It expressly recognises that academics should be free to express controversial, unusual and unpopular opinions, even where those opinions may shock or offend, without prejudicing their employment or promotion prospects. It also acknowledges that finding something offensive does not automatically make it harassment.
These are welcome commitments. But they raise the question of whether the University's administrative culture has changed as much as its written policies.
Indeed, Warwick's own approach to Equality Impact Assessments raises another question. The University's Social Inclusion Group has specific guidance on the relationship between these assessments and freedom of speech. To its credit, this guidance explicitly recognises that institutional procedures can themselves create a chilling effect and that lawful expression must be protected. But the very need to balance inclusion considerations against freedom of speech in routine institutional decision-making illustrates the potential for bureaucratic caution to become an obstacle to open debate. I would like to know how Warwick ensures that these procedures protect controversial expression rather than encourage organisers and administrators to treat unpopular opinions as risks requiring mitigation.
Throughout these campus speech controversies, what alumni like me have looked for, and rarely found, is candid institutional leadership acknowledging the deeper cultural problem. You have previously demonstrated a willingness to speak frankly when acknowledging institutional failures in other areas, including admitting that the University had got things wrong and recognising a legacy of mistrust in its handling of complaints. I would like to see the same candour applied to the University's record on freedom of speech.
The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 has now strengthened universities' statutory obligations. Its principal duties came into force in August 2025, and the Office for Students' Free Speech Complaints Scheme became operational on 1 September 2026. Staff, applicants for academic posts, visiting speakers and non-student members can now bring eligible complaints where they claim to have suffered adverse consequences as a result of a university's breach of its freedom-of-speech duties. Further regulatory provisions are due to take effect in April 2027.
These are important developments. But they do not necessarily address the problem I am describing.
An Act of Parliament can require universities to protect lawful speech. It can provide a mechanism for challenging institutional failures. What legislation cannot easily do is prevent an administration from using preliminary inquiries, prolonged investigations and procedural uncertainty to discourage dissent. Nor can it readily establish whether an outspoken academic has quietly been passed over for promotion because their opinions are unwelcome to colleagues or university management.
This brings me to the question that still keeps my cheque book closed: will new legislation actually change the culture that permits freedom of speech to be suppressed through bureaucratic process?
I would like to see Warwick make some clear and practical commitments:
That no formal disciplinary investigation will be initiated merely because an academic or student has expressed a lawful, albeit unpopular or offensive, opinion.
That initial triage will identify and dismiss complaints concerning protected political and academic expression where there is no reasonable prospect of establishing a breach of civil or criminal law, ensuring that no member of staff is again subjected to Stage 3 proceedings over such expression.
That Equality Impact Assessments and Social Inclusion procedures will never be used as bureaucratic hurdles to delay, dilute or discourage controversial speakers and events.
That the University will publish annual, anonymised figures showing how many speech-related complaints were received, how many were dismissed at triage, and how many resulted in formal investigations.
Until Warwick demonstrates in practice—not merely in revised regulations—that it will shield dissenters from the ordeal of investigation itself, my alumni donations will remain on hold.

Yours ever

Brendan Bruce

(History & Politics/1971-1974)

Commentaires
* L'e-mail ne sera pas publié sur le site web.