Sitting in France watching the latest Westminster drama unfold ahead of this week's Brussels summit, one thing is becoming painfully clear: Andy Burnham doesn't understand the French. Back in Britain, the debate over Europe is still trapped inside the same old British bubble. Burnham wants a "national conversation" about closer ties with the EU.
Some of his Labour colleagues are dreaming of a manifesto pledge for a referendum on rejoining. And the usual Westminster suspects seem to imagine that, if Britain eventually asks to come back, Brussels will be so delighted that it will roll out the red carpet.
Perhaps the British can even negotiate another of their ingenious little exceptions, like the so-called Swedish fudge that would allow them to promise to adopt the euro without ever actually doing so.
There is just one problem. The French.
Living permanently in France gives you a rather different perspective on all this. And if Burnham eventually wins an election on a promise to take Britain back into the EU, he may discover that the person sitting across the negotiating table is Marine Le Pen.
In which case, he is in for a very nasty surprise.
To understand why, you have to understand something about the French attitude to Europe—and particularly to Britain. For decades, the French watched Britain demand rebates, opt-outs, special arrangements and exceptions to rules that everyone else was expected to obey.
What the British regarded as sensible pragmatism, the French frequently regarded as le beurre et l'argent du beurre—wanting the butter and the money for the butter.
The British thought they were being clever. The French thought they were being British.
And there is now some rather inconvenient polling evidence to support the proposition that French patience with British exceptionalism has its limits. A YouGov survey in June 2026 found that 58% of French people would welcome Britain back into the EU.
Splendid news, you might think, for the rejoin campaign. Unfortunately, there was a catch. When respondents were asked whether Britain should be allowed to retain its old opt-outs, support for rejoining fell to just 36%, with 40% opposed. Around three in five French and German respondents thought Britain should have to participate in the EU's major policies, including the euro and Schengen.
Now compare that with Britain. In November, YouGov found that only 19% of British voters supported adopting the euro, while 70% opposed it. There, in two sets of opinion polls, is the entire problem. The British want to rejoin without surrendering the pound. The French want Britain back only on terms that would make it a proper member of the club.
And the French are not particularly enthusiastic about enlarging that club in the first place. The spring 2026 Eurobarometer found that just 35% supported further EU enlargement, the lowest proportion in the Union, while 54% were opposed. French voters worry about immigration, competition, agriculture, the cost to taxpayers and the dilution of French influence. They are hardly likely to be thrilled by the prospect of admitting a large, argumentative former member whose principal contribution to European politics for half a century was to demand special treatment.
In other words, the British may be longing to come home. But the French have changed the locks.
Enter Marine Le Pen
Now imagine Burnham winning the next British general election on a promise to renegotiate the terms of EU membership and put the result to a referendum. Meanwhile, Marine Le Pen has won the 2027 French presidential election and is sitting in the Élysée Palace.
Does anyone seriously imagine she would make life easy for him? Le Pen is not a Brussels technocrat trying to balance a spreadsheet. She is a French nationalist whose political career has been built on sovereignty, national identity and resistance to supranational authority. The notion that she would happily facilitate Britain's return to the EU, particularly on terms designed to preserve British exceptionalism, strikes me as bordering on the absurd.
Consider the euro. Burnham has already said he cannot imagine recommending that Britain abandon the pound or join Schengen. But a returning Britain would be negotiating accession under today's rules, not simply dusting off its old membership agreement. There is, admittedly, the Swedish precedent. Sweden is formally committed to adopting the euro but has avoided doing so by remaining outside the exchange-rate mechanism that precedes entry. One can almost hear the British negotiators explaining this ingenious arrangement to their French counterparts.
And one can equally imagine Marine Le Pen explaining it to the French electorate. Here come the British again, she would say. They left the club, spent years complaining about it, now want to come back, and still expect the rules to be rewritten for their convenience. It would be political gold dust.
And ask yourself one simple question. If Marine Le Pen is sitting in the Élysée Palace, who would she rather see in Downing Street—Andy Burnham or Nigel Farage?
The Farage Factor
The relationship between Le Pen and Farage has undergone a remarkable transformation. For years, Farage kept his distance from Le Pen's National Front, regarding its historical associations as politically toxic. The two movements occupied similar territory on European sovereignty but were hardly natural bedfellows. How times have changed.
In September 2026, Le Pen's political protégé, Jordan Bardella, appeared alongside Farage at Reform UK's conference in Birmingham. The two signed a memorandum of understanding on Channel migration, promising cooperation between future nationalist governments in Paris and London. It was a striking spectacle: the leaders of two nationalist movements, once separated by the Channel and considerable political suspicion, presenting themselves as partners in government-in-waiting.
The agreement immediately ran into criticism in France, where the prospect of accepting migrants intercepted by Britain was considerably less popular than the rhetoric accompanying it. But the symbolism mattered more than the paperwork. Farage and Bardella were publicly advertising a political partnership. Le Pen celebrated Brexit as a victory for national sovereignty. Farage regards the European Union as an institution from which Britain was right to escape. Both have an interest in weakening the political establishment that regards European integration as an unquestionable good.
That does not mean their national interests will always coincide. Nationalists, after all, have an unfortunate habit of discovering that other countries have national interests too. But on one issue their political incentives would be remarkably similar: neither has much reason to help a Labour prime minister demonstrate that reversing Brexit would be painless.
A successful Burnham referendum would be a political humiliation for Farage and an ideological embarrassment for Le Pen. A failed one would suit them both rather nicely.
And Le Pen would not even need to campaign for Farage. She could simply insist on terms that were popular in France and politically poisonous in Britain.
Here is the part that Westminster seems particularly reluctant to discuss. Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, admitting a new member requires unanimous agreement among the existing member states and ratification according to their constitutional requirements. France therefore has a veto.
But France has something else, too. Under Article 88-5 of the French Constitution, the ratification of a treaty admitting a new EU member is normally submitted to a national referendum. Parliament can avoid that referendum, but only through a demanding procedure requiring identical motions approved by three-fifths majorities in both the National Assembly and the Senate.
Think about the implications. Burnham could spend years negotiating an accession treaty, persuade the British electorate to vote for it, and then discover that the whole enterprise depends on persuading the French electorate to vote for it too.
And who might be presiding over that French referendum? Marine Le Pen. Referendums are central to her political philosophy. It is difficult to imagine her passing up the opportunity to ask French voters whether Britain should be readmitted to the European Union, particularly if the proposed terms appeared to give London privileges denied to other members. She would have an entire armoury of negotiating weapons.
The euro. Why should Britain be permitted to preserve a permanent exemption from the single currency when new members are normally required to commit to adopting it? Any attempt to recreate the Swedish arrangement could become a major political controversy.
The budget. Why should Britain recover its old rebate? Why should French taxpayers subsidise a country that voluntarily left the Union and now wants to return?
Fishing. Why should French fishermen surrender access to British waters as the price of welcoming Britain back? A French government would have every reason to make fishing rights part of the negotiation.
Schengen. Why should Britain enjoy another permanent exception to one of the EU's central arrangements?
None of these questions requires Le Pen to invent some extraordinary new French policy. They arise naturally from the terms on which a returning Britain would have to negotiate.
And every concession Burnham made would become another headline for Nigel Farage. Burnham Surrenders the Pound. Britain Hands Back Its Fishing Waters. British Taxpayers Face Billions in Brussels Payments. Imagine trying to win a British referendum with that lot appearing on the front pages every morning.
The real trap is that Burnham would be negotiating with two electorates simultaneously. Every concession designed to satisfy the French could make his position more difficult in Britain. Every exception demanded to reassure British voters could make the treaty less acceptable in France. He could end up with an agreement that pleased neither.
And that is before we consider what Le Pen herself might be doing to the European Union. Her National Rally has abandoned its earlier ambition to take France out of the EU and the euro. Instead, it wants to assert French sovereignty from within, challenge European legal and institutional constraints and recover powers for the nation-state.
So Burnham could find himself negotiating to join an institution whose rules the French president was simultaneously trying to rewrite. It would be rather like applying to join a gentlemen's club while its chairman was busy selling the furniture. *
What If the World Turns Upside Down and Mélenchon Wins? Perhaps some Labour optimists imagine that salvation might come from the other end of the French political spectrum. What if Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the radical left, defeats Le Pen in 2027? Surely a socialist president would be more sympathetic to a Labour prime minister? Don't bet on it.
Mélenchon's newly updated L'Avenir en commun programme, unveiled in November 2026, proposes a fundamental confrontation with the existing European economic order. He wants France to disobey European rules that conflict with his programme, challenge the EU's fiscal and competition framework, resist liberalisation, suspend the application of certain European provisions and pursue a phased withdrawal from NATO. He explicitly says France would remain inside the EU and the eurozone.
But remaining inside an institution while refusing to obey rules one dislikes is hardly a recipe for harmonious relations with Brussels. Nor would Mélenchon necessarily be enthusiastic about welcoming back a Britain determined to preserve its own economic exceptions.
His movement wants stronger social, fiscal and environmental protections, not a deregulated British economy enjoying special privileges within the single market.
Then there is also the small matter of referendums. Mélenchon is an enthusiastic advocate of popular sovereignty and constitutional change. There is little reason to assume he would quietly wave through a British accession treaty without subjecting it to political scrutiny.
Of course, Mélenchon and Le Pen disagree profoundly about the future of France. But both reject important elements of the existing European settlement, and neither has any obvious political interest in making British re-entry an easy triumph for Andy Burnham.
For Burnham, negotiating with President Mélenchon might be less like a friendly conversation between socialist comrades and more like trying to buy a railway ticket while the driver is ripping up the tracks.
There is a peculiarly British conceit running through the whole rejoin debate: the assumption that Britain's relationship with Europe is something Britain can decide for itself. It was there during the original Brexit negotiations, when politicians solemnly announced what the European Union would have to accept. It is there again today. Burnham can hold as many national conversations as he likes. He can convene citizens' assemblies, commission reports, consult economists, hold town-hall meetings and produce an exquisitely balanced manifesto promising to restore Britain's place in Europe without inconveniencing anyone. He can even persuade the British public to vote for it. But none of that gives him the right to dictate the terms of admission.
There are 27 countries already inside the European Union. Every one of them would have to agree to let Britain back. And one of them is France. A country where public opinion is deeply sceptical of further enlargement, where voters are reluctant to grant Britain its old privileges, where the constitution provides for a possible national referendum on accession, and where the next president could be Marine Le Pen—or Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
For all their differences, neither is likely to regard the political rehabilitation of British membership as a personal priority. That is the uncomfortable truth missing from Westminster's increasingly enthusiastic discussion of rejoining. Britain may decide it wants to return to Europe. Fair enough. But Europe is under no obligation to take it back. There is, of course, a historical precedent that Andy Burnham might care to remember.
In November 1967, another Labour prime minister, Harold Wilson, wanted to take Britain into Europe. The French president, Charles de Gaulle, had other ideas. His answer was a resounding Non!
Nearly sixty years later, Burnham might reflect on whether he really wants to follow Wilson down the same road to national humiliation.
* Reminiscent of Geoffrey Howe's famous resignation speech in 1990 over EU policy: "It’s rather like sending our opening batsmen to the crease only for them to find that before the first ball is bowled, their bats have been broken by the team captain. The time has come for others to consider their own response to the tragic conflict of loyalties with which I have myself wrestled for perhaps too long." I was there that day, sitting in the Press Gallery of the House of Commons. I was listening intently (like everybody else, you could have heard a pin drop), but I was watching Thatcher's face. At this part, she looked like she had suddenly bit into a lemon. But her iron self-control quickly reasserted itself. Then I looked at the rest of the Front Bench and saw that The End Was Nigh. Nine days later, she was gone.